2020 Pension Schemes Bill: establishing collective defined contribution pensions in the UK

Briefing note

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The RSA (Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce) believes in a world where everyone is able to participate in creating a better future. Through our ideas, research and a 30,000 strong Fellowship, we are a global community of proactive problem solvers. Uniting people and ideas to resolve the challenges of our time.

About the project
The Collective Defined Contribution (CDC) Pensions Forum emerged from the RSA’s Tomorrow’s Investor programme. Tomorrow’s Investor was established in 2008 and chaired by Sir John Banham. It examined the UK pension system and whether it could be improved to deliver better outcomes for savers and the wider economy. One of its key recommendations was that a framework should be introduced to allow CDC pensions to operate in the UK. Like Defined Benefit (DB) pensions, CDC provides savers with an income in retirement and, with DB being closed in the private sector, does so much more effectively than any available alternative. It is this that led to the decision by Royal Mail and the Communication Workers Union (CWU) to commit to delivering the UK’s first CDC scheme in 2018. The Forum has aimed to support the policy debate and ensure that we take the opportunity to establish CDC plans that benefit the saver, within an effective regulatory framework and with appropriate governance. The Forum has sponsored several publications and events to support this work.

Acknowledgements
The authors would particularly like to acknowledge the efforts of the Royal Mail and their trade unions, particularly the CWU, for developing the practical proposals needed for the implementation of CDC. The evidence suggests that these will offer better pensions to Royal Mail employees than alternative Defined Contribution arrangements.

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Contents

Executive summary 3
Background 4
Benefits versus pitfalls of CDC 6
The Pension Schemes Act 2015 7
The Pension Schemes Bill 2020 8
Regulatory and governance issues to be addressed 9
Where concerns have been raised 11
Opportunities 12
Conclusion 13
Further information 14
Executive summary

On 7th January 2020, the government introduced a Pension Schemes Bill to the House of Lords, similar to the one introduced in October 2019. Part of the Bill will enable the establishment of Collective Defined Contribution (CDC) pensions, known as Collective Money Purchase (CMP) schemes in the Bill, in the UK. This measure was already promised in both Conservative and Labour Party manifestos,¹ and supported by the Work and Pensions Select Committee. Its immediate effect will allow the introduction of CDC, should companies and their employees wish to do so. Royal Mail and the Communication Workers Union (CWU) have already committed to CDC but the measure has much wider implications for pensions in Britain. We therefore believe there are three key messages of which legislators might want to be aware.

1. For many years the RSA has campaigned in support of CDC in the UK. We believe it will make a very important contribution to pension provision. We therefore firmly support the Bill.

2. If CDC is to deliver its full benefits and avoid potential pitfalls, this must be done within an effective system of governance and regulation – this note discusses what those are and is generally positive that they are covered in the legislation.

3. CDC offers very considerable benefits. The present legislation will be effective for large employers such as Royal Mail, but its benefits could be spread more widely. It is important that those who are making pension policy have some vision of how CDC might be best encouraged to develop over the coming years, so that as many people as wish to can save in a cost-effective manner for a pension income which will last the length of their lifetime.

We have updated this note to review recent research on how CDC pensions would have been affected by the changes in market conditions in the first quarter of 2020 consequent on the coronavirus pandemic.

¹. The Conservative Manifesto 2019 said “we will reintroduce legislation that… creates a new style of pension scheme which is more sustainable for workers and employers”. The Labour Manifesto 2019 said “we will legislate to allow the CWU-Royal Mail agreement for a collective pension scheme to proceed and allow similar schemes”.

Collective defined contribution pensions
Our starting point is that, for many, the ultimate goal of a pension is to create an income which lasts until the end of their life, typically starting when they retire. CDC is a good way to provide such a pension cost-effectively. This is particularly relevant in the private sector where there are few other ways to provide a cost-effective pension as an income for life.

There are other pension structures for example state pensions, pensions for the Civil Service, the NHS, teachers, and the army. They are provided on an unfunded, pay as you go, basis. However, only the government can provide such pensions relatively securely since it has powers of taxation.

Alternatively, individuals can simply save for themselves, choosing their own investment strategy and choosing how to draw down from those savings in retirement. This is currently a common approach in the UK via ‘Defined Contribution’ (DC) pension funds which are then drawn down.

There is a problem with drawdown that has been observed in Australia and South Africa where it is more established - if everyone saves enough to last them until the upper end of the range of their possible lifespan, most people will save more than necessary; if everyone saves enough for an average lifespan, half of them will run out of money in old age when most vulnerable.

That is why the most effective pension systems allow individuals to share ‘longevity risk’. Individual savers can currently do this by buying an annuity when they retire. Indeed historically, individual pension savers were, in effect, forced to buy an annuity. Annuities can be expensive however, and in 2015 measures were introduced to allow DC pension savers to use their money in other ways.

An alternative way to share longevity risk is through a ‘Defined Benefit’ (DB) scheme. In the past this was the backbone of the UK occupational pension system and the way in which the majority of workers were provided with occupational pension benefits. When DB originally became popular in the middle of the 20th Century, DB pensions had a degree of flexibility in the way in which they were operated and the benefits they provided. However, during the 1980s and 90s, DB pensions looked like they had more than enough to meet their needs, and companies took pension contribution holidays. In response, legislation and other factors successively hard wired the DB pension promise, including ensuring that they were largely inflation proof. With falling asset returns, rising inflation levels, and lengthening member longevity these guaranteed inflation-proof pensions ultimately became unaffordable for most private sector employers, and most DB plans are now closed or closing.
CDC offers a middle ground. Similar to early DB, it offers an income in retirement but with some flexibility in the pension paid. Like DC, the pension can only be paid from the money which has been subscribed. Legislation needs to be clear that a CDC pension scheme cannot ask the employer for further funds beyond those which it is already committed. Versions of this system operate in the Netherlands, Denmark, and other countries which are generally considered to have some of the best pension systems in the world, albeit all have encountered issues with their pension systems which offer important lessons for the UK.
The benefits of CDC are considerable. CDC is likely to provide a much higher income in retirement than the alternative of individual saving and then buying an annuity. All studies suggest that CDC will give at least a 30% higher retirement income than a conventional DC scheme with an annuity. This is achieved through its ability to share longevity risk, and to support targeting higher asset returns than is possible for an annuity provider (a summary of these studies is provided in Appendix 1).

In the build up to retirement CDC can also offer a more predictable outcome than an annuity for which the level depends on asset values and annuity prices on the day it is purchased. It can provide a pension to members by default, without each individual needing to choose their own investment strategy or choose between a wide range of options at retirement.

However, to be successful, pension savers need to understand that there is no guarantee on the level of a CDC pension. Whatever pension is paid by the pension fund must be met by the resources of the fund itself. Unlike DB, it cannot go back to the employer and ask for more. So, it needs to be possible for CDC pensions to vary if future events prove better or worse than predicted. Such changes may not be very dramatic and can generally be accommodated by raising pensions by more or less than inflation. However, sometimes pensions, including those in payment, might need to be reduced. For example, following the 2008 financial crisis the Dutch reduced CDC pensions by 2% on average. Those enrolled in a CDC pension plan need to know the nature of their pension, and feel justifiably confident that the design of the scheme will result in pensions that are fair for all.

**Covid case study**

*The movements in capital markets following the coronavirus pandemic provide an interesting test case.*

Willis Towers Watson, a leading actuary, modelled how a CDC pension would respond to reflect the drop in capital values over the first quarter of 2020. They did their calculations based on the Royal Mail’s scheme design. On their estimate, there would have been limited effect on CDC pension levels, with this year’s increase, and projected annual increases in the pension reducing by 0.25% per year. By comparison, the cost of an annuity has risen by 8%, therefore a CDC design would have been relatively robust.
The benefits of a more flexible pension system have been apparent for some time. In 2015, with cross party agreement, Parliament passed an Act that would have allowed CDC and ‘Defined Ambition’ pensions. However, the Act was constructed in such a way that was designed to change the entire pension system. Therefore, it was never acted upon.

In 2018, Royal Mail and the CWU agreed they would like to establish a CDC structure to replace the closing DB scheme. Their advisors noted that although such a structure could not yet be established, Parliament had agreed in principle to it being introduced. They agreed a proposal for the establishment of a CDC pension for Royal Mail employees. They are pioneers and are committed to implementing their pension plan once the legislation is in place. However, we know of others who would be keen to consider CDC once legislation is in place.

The key thing was to establish a practical mechanism to do so. That is what the 2020 Bill seeks to do.
The Pension Schemes Bill 2020

The 2020 Bill (the Bill) covers three main topics: CDC, Pension Dashboard, and other measures to protect DB pensions. This briefing relates only to CDC.

The Bill provides the legislative framework for CDC Pensions. It is written in a way which makes clear the areas where regulation will be required. It also outlines the foundations on which that regulation will be made.

The present legislation is intended to allow the Royal Mail proposal to proceed and allow other private sector organisations to create similar arrangements. It does not allow for unrelated companies to work together, to create a single CDC pension plan. Since effective pensions require some economies of scale, this in effect excludes smaller companies from the option of CDC, at least for now. Clause 47 gives the government powers to allow multi-employer CDC schemes and/or providers to offer CDC Master Trusts, to remove this constraint for small employers. In our view, this is a significant opportunity, and subject to consultation, we would encourage the government to act on this.
The Bill covers regulatory and governance issues. Many of these are left to secondary legislation. However, parliamentarians will want to understand these. In this briefing, we touch on the most significant issues, and why they are important.

**Trustee governance:**
Pension systems are best operated by entities which owe a duty only to work in the interests of the beneficiaries. This is particularly important where choice is complex and suppliers can be tempted to behave in a way that is not in beneficiaries’ interests. It can be achieved by ensuring the pension fund is governed by trustees – particularly those nominated by the members. Of course, such trustees can and should employ professional advisors, administrators, and fund managers where they can offer a better service. But they do so only in the interests of beneficiaries. In a world where savers are often unaware of how their pension fund is managed the protection provided by effective trustee governance is important.

**Actuarial expertise:**
CDC pensions require careful calculation of what is the appropriate level of pension to pay. Such actuarial calculations are common in the financial system, for example for life insurance premiums. They also need to be incorporated within a CDC system to be sure that pensions are fairly delivered in accordance with the mechanisms established at the outset of the scheme’s design and as communicated to its members.

**Communication with members:**
This is particularly important in CDC. CDC pension levels are not guaranteed; instead there is a promise to pay CDC pensions in accordance with the rules explained to the member when they join the scheme. During stable times, CDC payments may seem very reliable, however when any unexpected change is made this may be met with concern. This is what happened in the Netherlands after the 2008 financial crisis. On average where there were reductions, pensions in payment were reduced by 2%. One fund had to reduce by 6%, to make the actuarial calculations balance. The Dutch system had seen no adjustment for many years, nor had the potential for reductions been clearly communicated, so the reduction caused much furore.  

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4. Royal Mail carried out actuarial modelling of their scheme design. It suggests that it would not have to have reduced pensions after the 2008 crisis (instead, pensions increases would have reduced). Nevertheless, a reduction in pensions is possible after severe or sustained falls in markets, and members need to know that this is a possibility, particularly when such adjustments have not been apparent for many years.
Protection of the sponsor:  
DB pension plans were closed because they proved risky and unaffordable by the companies sponsoring them. Additionally, under DB, pension liabilities were recognised on the company’s balance sheet. Many companies felt that the pension legislation that was introduced created obligations to which they had never agreed. They are unlikely to back CDC pensions if there is any likelihood that new obligations could be placed upon them through reclassification in future. Legislation needs to be clear that this will not happen.

Linkage to other parts of the UK pension system:  
Legislation should be drawn up in a way which fits with other parts of the pension system. CDC pensions should be transferable, for example, so that the DC pension freedoms are available to CDC members. The communication of the potential CDC pension level could in part be adapted from the approaches currently used in DC, and it is desirable that the tax treatment of CDC pensions is based on a combination of current DB and DC pension tax treatments, as appropriate.

Transferring pensions:  
In establishing transfer rules it is important to get the balance right. Savers should have pension freedoms but the transfer system should not be such that CDC savers are encouraged to transfer out without properly assessing whether it is in their interests - individually and collectively - to do so. There is a provision in the Bill to allow the Regulator to temporarily ‘pause’ the transfer option, which mitigates the risk of large-scale transfer out of the system due to misinformation. This would allow the trustees time to explain to members why the CDC pension still represents good value for money. Consideration is also required to transfer advice requirements in a way which is practical for independent financial advisory firms to meet.

What can and cannot be achieved:  
All these potential issues surrounding CDC can be addressed - we know this since they operate successfully in other countries - but none can be addressed perfectly, because the future cannot be predicted with certainty. As one observer of the Dutch system noted “all are better off but some are better off than others”. In designing CDC systems, it is important that its design is simple, so that it can be easily understood. It is also important that any material difference in benefit levels result from unforeseen uncertainties, not from the design of the pension plan itself so that younger or older people don’t benefit at the others’ expense, for example. Trustee governance, expert actuarial guidance, clear communication, simplicity, and integration into the existing pension system will be key elements in the successful development of CDC.
Where concerns have been raised

There has been some opposition to CDC. Some arises from the belief that there will be little demand for CDC. The advisors to Britain’s pension funds contributing to this briefing believe that there is latent demand, however it is not very apparent while CDC pensions are still being written into law.

Other opposition has arisen from turning a blind eye to the advantages of CDC and focusing on whether the considerations above may prove unmanageable. For example, some talk about intergenerational unfairness and have said that trustees will always pay out too much to existing pensioners, and younger members will be disadvantaged. Others have focussed on the reduction in payments in the version of CDC in the Netherlands, post 2008, missing the point that for the main alternative of DC pensions, pension expectations started at a lower point and also typically fell before retirement under the same circumstances. Technical details have been raised, such as how a CDC scheme could be closed should the sponsor fail. Many of these are perfectly sensible issues to raise and debate. Similar issues exist with other pension and life insurance arrangements and clearly the governance and regulatory system must be designed to cope with these issues.

In general, we believe that the Bill provides a good framework for the introduction of CDC for Royal Mail and other employers, particularly noting that the Regulator will act as a gatekeeper to ensure only well-designed CDC schemes can open. If we had two detailed points which legislators might review they would be:

- That authorisation requirements for opening a CDC scheme, and the process to certify ongoing viability, do not prove too cumbersome.
- That there is a proper balance of prescription in scheme rules and trustee, actuarial, and regulatory oversight. We think there is, but this governance issue is worthy of debate.

Neither of these are major concerns. The more important issue is how CDC might develop in the future. It is on this point where we think a continuing dialogue between the government and Parliament would bear most fruit.
Opportunities

The immediate focus for CDC is with Royal Mail. However, CDC is potentially a very big opportunity for pension policy. Academic and actuarial studies suggest that, over time, CDC will yield 30%+ higher pensions than are currently available through individual savings and annuities. This is an enormous sum. About 6% of GDP is spent on private pensions—they represent £3 trillion of accumulated savings.

A more effective pension system could make a huge contribution to addressing welfare and poverty in old age. It could also be a source of capital for renewed investment.

There are several opportunities for its broader introduction. All need to be carefully thought through, so that we end up with a system which is designed to be ‘fit for purpose’. For example, this might mean that we should design a system suited to a limited number of funds each of which enjoys economies of scale. We might encourage similar administrative and other systems, so that people can readily move their pension when they change employers or enter self-employment.

How might things develop in the future?

- It should surely be possible for groups of employers (such as those in the same industry) to get together to introduce CDC. Otherwise smaller companies are placed at a disadvantage as they cannot access CDC cost effectively.
- The biggest gap in Britain’s pension system is not in the savings phase; automatic enrolment has proved a success in getting most employees to save but there is a gap when people retire. People generally say they want a regular retirement income, but most aren’t buying insured annuities presumably because of their relative expense. CDC could readily be a popular model to allow people to buy with their DC savings a cost-effective – albeit non-guaranteed – pension which will last for the rest of their life.
- The National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) already provides a default pension saving fund for the accumulation stage. Might they be encouraged to provide a CDC default particularly for smaller employers? And might they, together with others, offer a cost-effective system for pensions in payment, as described in the bullet above? In both cases, these could be offered alongside commercial providers.
- We currently lack an effective pension system for the self-employed. CDC Master Trusts could be a solution for them, just as they are for those in employment.
Conclusion

If the 2020 Pension Schemes Bill and accompanying regulations are appropriately finalised and enacted, this will allow Royal Mail and other employers to introduce CDC. This is an important step forward.

However, there are other important areas where CDC can help ensure the UK has an occupational pension system which is fit for purpose; that it provides an income for the rest of your life. The UK has yet to develop a clear consensus about how this might best be achieved. While we support for passage of the Bill, we believe it is an opportunity to begin that discussion.

Citations from previous page:
5. ONS and RSA analysis
6. WTW, for example, reported that their Global Benefits Attitudes Survey 2017 (UK polling) revealed that 60% of members want a guaranteed monthly payment (although this detail was not included in the published global summary).
7. See the FCA’s retirement income market data 2018/19 which showed that 11% of at-retirement DC product purchases in the year to March 2019 were annuities. Available at: www.fca.org.uk/data/retirement-income-market-data.
For further information on any of the issues raised in this briefing please contact Mark Hall, Deputy Head of Engagement at the Royal Society of Arts (RSA) at mark.hall@rsa.org.uk.

You can also find details of the key contacts at those organisations who provided input for this briefing below.

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In this Appendix we review the studies which have been done to evaluate CDC. All show a 30 percent plus upside for CDC over DC saving plus annuity, which we believe is the best like-for-like comparator. Indeed, the latest study commissioned by the DWP suggests a higher upside than that. 

Almeida and Fornia simply look at how much more you need to save individually if you want to be 97.5 percent sure that you will not run out of funds before you die. They compare that with a situation where longevity risk is shared and effectively eliminated. They conclude that the cost of the former is more expensive by 83 percent. This is equivalent to a comparison of DC plus drawdown.


In reality, a saver can buy an annuity. The Government Actuary modelled this some years back. Part of their model though assumed that a CDC scheme had made hard promises and so could become insolvent (that should never be part of the design). However, their upside for an open CDC scheme compared to DC was 39 percent.

See first paper in this zip file:

At the RSA we did a very simple ‘cost accounting’, looking at where the upside comes from in terms of cost and return. We calculated an upside of 37 percent.

The RSA with Aon then worked on the modelling of DC versus CDC, starting from 1930. This models what would have happened to an individual who saved for 25 years and then retired, comparing DC and CDC outcomes. Our publication also reviews other literature.


Aon's full study explains their assumptions. It yielded a 33 percent upside, on the best like-for-like comparison.


Finally, the government asked the Pensions Policy Institute to do another modelling in 2015. It compared a mature and stable CDC scheme with individual DC. The former produced an income replacement of 27 percent to 30 percent. The latter, a lower and more varied rate of 12 percent to 21 percent. Taking the median, outcome of CDC is 28.5 percent, and DC 16.5 percent. That means CDC gave a 73 percent better outcome.

www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/publications/reports/modelling-collective-defined-contribution-schemes

Other Bibliography

Parliamentarians may also be interested in a book by Dutch academics called The Costs and Benefits of Collective Pension Systems. This points out that some element of intergenerational transfer may mean that under CDC “all are better off but some are better off than others”.

www.amazon.co.uk/Costs-Benefits-Collective-Pension-Systems/dp/3540743731
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